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Development
of the Audiovisual Industry in Brazil from Importer to Exporter
of Television Programming
de
Melo, J. (1995, January 1). Development of the Audiovisual
Industry in Brazil from Importer to Exporter of Television
Programming. Canadian Journal of Communication [Online], 20(3).
Available: http://www.cjc-online.ca/viewarticle.php?id=303.
Jose Marques de Melo (Methodist University of São Paulo)
Abstract: In Latin America at mid-century, the formal media
of communication (press, radio, cinema) satisfied the tastes
of the colonizing elites for European and American programming,
while the informal types of communication (songs, dances,
poetry) remained faithful to indigenous local values. In the
1970s, the extension of broadcasting systems created a demand
for popular cultural programming. There was also an increase
in the regional exchange of programming between Latin American
nations. Gradually, Latin American popular programs have begun
to co-exist naturally with imported ones. Using Brazil as
a case study, the article details some Brazilian networks'
(Globo, Manchete, Bandeirantes) recent success as international
exporters of popular genres (telenovelas, popular music),
as Latin America begins to overcome its history of cultural
dependency.
Résumé:
En Amérique latine à mi-siècle, les moyens
de communication formels (presse, radio, cinéma) répondaient
aux demandes des élites métropolitaines pour
des émissions européenes et nord-américaines,
pendant que les genres de communication informels (chansons,
danses, poésie) ont resté fidèles aux
valeurs locaux et indigènes. Dans les années
soixante-dix, l'extension des systèmes de radiodiffusion
crée une demande pour des émissions culturelles
populaires. Il y avait aussi une hausse dans l'échange
régionale d'émissions entre des pays de l'Amérique
latine. Graduellement, les émissions populaires de
l'Amérique latine commençent à coexister
naturellement avec des émissions importées.
Prenant comme exemple le Brésil, cette étude
démontre les succès récents de quelques
réseaux de télévision brésiliens
(Globo, Manchete, Bandeirantes) comme exportateurs internationaux
des genres populaires (téléromans, musique populaire)
pendant que l'Amérique latine commence à surmonter
son histoire de dépendance culturelle.
The history
of Latin American communications reveals a profound subordination
to the cultural models transplanted by the Iberian colonizers.
This was an elitist system, constructed to serve the interests
of the governing minority which benefited from the potential
of the press--books, periodicals, and newspapers--and the
richness of artistic events--music, dance, and theatre--to
reproduce the patterns of communication and culture prevalent
in the Spanish and Portuguese royal courts. In Latin America,
however, the intellectual isolation of the elites allowed
for the development of a vibrant popular culture, forged from
the existing indigenous civilizations and mixed with those
of the manual labourers brought from Africa, Asia, and other
parts of Europe. To disseminate this mixed culture, the impoverished
masses of our continent created original models of popular
communication, preserving their own ethical and aesthetic
values.
Until
the middle of this century, the Latin American systems of
communication stagnated. The formal networks of communication
(press, radio, and cinema) met the expectations of the elites
and inspired models of metropolitan (i.e., European and United
States) hegemonic control. But the informal types of communication
(songs, dances, poetry, and satire) remained faithful to popular
values, resisting external dependence and consolidating national
or regional patterns of communication.
With the introduction of electronic communications systems,
and the beginnings of a mass broadcasting audience, came the
inevitable search for the roots of popular culture and a surge
of typical programming, where the national and the transnational,
the mass and the popular, were mixed. Gradually, the Latin-Americanization
of our cultural industry manifested itself, co-existing naturally
with products imported from other regions.
There
was also an increase in regional exchange, creating a Latin
American common market in cultural products. Recently, production
companies of genres legitimized by mass culture (especially
telenovelas and popular music) have been starting to compete
on international markets and to project Latin American values
on the global scene. From a continent that was exclusively
an importer of consumption goods and lifestyles, Latin America
is now becoming an exporter of information and leisure, and
is starting to overcome its history of cultural dependency.
These new symbolic flows--south-north and south-south--are
indicative of Sean MacBride's vision: a new world information
and communication order, less unidirectional and more balanced
(MacBride, 1980).
Pointing
to this emerging tendency, we will study the case of the Brazilian
television industry, which has become a successful exporter
of telenovelas to the whole world and especially to Latin
America.
Television
and national integration
When the military staged a coup in 1964 and assumed control
of the government, Brazil was a cultural archipelago made
up of semi-autonomous geographical regions, despite the terrestrial
and aerial transport routes. During the development push of
Juscelino Kubitschek, the National System of Mass Communication
possessed mainly regional and local characteristics, except
for weekly reviews and short-wave radio programs, which accounted
for only a small part of programming. A major portion of the
population lived in rural areas, and the cultural gap was
worsened by a high illiteracy rate in and the precarious living
conditions of the communities in the interior.
The cycle
of modernization of Brazilian society, initiated by the authoritarian
government of Getulio Vargas and continued by the populist
governments of the post-war era, took on a new face with the
junta after 1964. The junta assumed a liberationist posture,
interrupting the almost-20-year experience with democratic
government. They started a lengthy process of eroding national
political institutions, starting with shutting down the existing
political parties, seizing control of the unions, and perpetrating
terrorism upon the intellectuals, the Church, and the universities.
The military leaders adopted a centralized political model,
suppressing the independence of the states which make up the
Brazilian federation. They also created the means to attract
multinational corporations and stimulate the national market
through mechanisms intended to concentrate profit, which significantly
increased the size of the middle class.
The television
industry, introduced in Brazil in the 1950s but growing slowly,
was restricting itself to the more populous urban centres.
The creation of national factories to make inexpensive television
sets opened up a consumer market. Thus, there were only 1.6
million television sets in use, inundated with signals from
more than 10 stations broadcasting in the major centres. An
elitist television predominated, with programming comprising
films, animated series, and variety shows imported from the
United States. There were some nationally produced programs,
usually live broadcasts of interviews, news, sports, theatre,
musicals, and the new genre of soap operas. This national
production gained strength with the introduction of video
tape technology, which eliminated the difficulties of live
recording. VTR technology also favoured the dissemination
of programs produced in the cities of São Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, headquarters of the parent companies of the
networks being formed.
Telecommunications
law initiated in the 1960s established a model including channels
entirely dependent on the federal government. This facilitated
the action of the military leaders, who understood the importance
of this vehicle for the project of accelerated societal modernization,
emphasizing national integration. Many resources were applied
to the creation of a complete infrastructure, which initially
comprised a microwave network complemented by artificial satellites.
The production of indigenous programming was also encouraged,
in part through restrictions on foreign ownership of communications
companies, and in part by an ideology fostering national security,
and emphasizing Brazilian cultural identity. In addition to
exercising censorship powers, the military governments converted
the state into the primary advertiser, subverting the increasing
publicity campaigns of the multinational corporations.
Another
factor which determined the nationalization of television
production is undoubtedly the addition of new population groups
to the television audience, quintupling the number of viewers
in 10 years. This incorporation of a larger population stratum
as consumers of televised cultural products obliged the branch
stations to get in tune with the preferences of the masses.
And so was initiated, for the many, a populist stage, marked
by the rescuing of aesthetic patterns characteristic of circus
humour, of the melodrama of the radio soap operas, and of
the rites of folkloric manifestations. Gradually, television
filled the void left by political inactivity, expelled from
the national scene by the military regime. ``Telemania'' was
incorporated into the Brazilian pattern of life, uniting families
at home to enjoy the daily spectacle transmitted on the video
screen. Aiming initiatives at the needy sectors of society,
local governments installed televisions in public squares,
democratizing access to growing national production, mainly
telenovelas, sports, and variety shows.
In this
way, television provided support for the legitimacy of the
military government, which, through censorship of television
news and interview shows, transmitted a nationalistic message
throughout the country. The government-sponsored messages
contained ingredients of xenophobia, patriarchy, and anti-communism.
Recognition of our own reality in television, even though
filtered through armies of censors, made a definite contribution
to national integration, spreading among Brazilians a feeling
of ``Brazilian-ness.'' At
the start of the 1980s, there were already 20 million television
sets in use in Brazil, with a penetration rate of 73% in urban
residences. By the early 1990s, this number increased to approximately
30 million, with an overall national penetration rate of 65%.
Evidently, there is a higher concentration of television viewers
in the southern and southeastern regions of the country. These
are the richest and most densely populated areas, having received
most of the internal immigration from other regions of the
country. It is important to note that today 70% of the Brazilian
population lives in urban areas, and television has certainly
replaced print as the way to educate these displaced masses,
helping them adjust to new living arrangements, find work,
and improve their lot.
Conquering
foreign markets
The consolidation of the Brazilian television industry was
accomplished in the 1980s, when the branch stations absorbed
a major part of the advertising market. In the early 1970s,
advertiser-funded television accounted for something like
25% of programming, increasing to 62% 20 years later. These
figures reflect the explosion of the viewer market, which
increased by almost 20 times in those years. Naturally, advertisers
began to prefer this new medium for delivering their messages,
as it allowed them to reach a national audience of almost
100 million potential consumers for their products. It must
be observed that this audience seduced by television was not
restricted to consumers but, above all, receivers of political
ideas or behavioural models. For this reason, the major Brazilian
advertisers are state-owned corporations or sub-governmental
departments.
One peculiarity
of Brazilian television is its great potential for disseminating
advertising. According to current legislation, ads can only
take up 15 minutes for each hour of programming. Nevertheless,
stations instituted a type of underhanded advertising--``merchandising''--which
creates a vehicle for commercial products in any program,
increasing the rate charged to sponsors. Therefore, while
the viewers are enjoying a telenovela or a musical show, they
can be assimilating subtle advertising messages because the
actors, singers, or presenters are exhibiting the products
they are using during the show.
This
capture of growing resources motivated the corporations to
upgrade program quality. The first company to advance this
view was the Globo Network, which started in the television
production business only in the 1970s, on the strength of
having been granted a channel by the government a few years
earlier. This coincided with the decline of the Tupi Network,
created by Assis Chateaubriand, the pioneer of Brazilian television.
Chateaubriand's multimedia business--Periódicos e Emisores
Asociadas (Associated Periodicals and Stations)--had a hegemonic
place in the panorama of national television. The strategy
adopted by Globo, which belongs to a family which holds a
solid position in the journalistic market of Rio de Janeiro,
was to search the international market for a company capable
of supplying its managerial and technological needs. Because
of the constitutional impediment to foreign involvement in
the communications sector, Globo signed a co-operation agreement
with the multinational Time-Life. The agreement was declared
illegal, after much debate in the national assembly. But while
the debate was taking place, Rede Globo absorbed an efficient
administration, good technology, and, more importantly, learned
how to produce programs like those being exported by the United
States to the rest of the world.
During
the 1970s, this business turned the national market around,
creating a network of affiliates, to whom Globo sold its prime-time
programming. Realizing that viewers preferred telenovelas,
Globo started competing with the paulista (i.e., of or from
São Paulo) stations, which held the largest audiences
for this genre. In the first stage, the Globo network contracted
the services of foreigners, among whom were the Cuban Gloria
Magadan, a producer of telenovelas exiled in Miami; the Panamanian
Homero Sanchez (who specializes in market research and motivational
studies); and the American manager, Joseph Wallach. Later,
they conscripted national talents who were known for their
work in radio, theatre, music, and advertising. People like
Janet Clair and Dias Gomes (dramatists); Walter Clark (advertiser);
Chico Barque, Caetano Veloso, and Gilberto Gil (musical composers);
Fernanda Montenegro, Paulo Autran, and Mario Lago (actors)
were all members of the cast. They also have contracts with
young artists, many of whom come out of the popular cultural
movements, persecuted by the military government for being
leftists, who discovered the impact of disseminating cultural
works in tune with the demands of the working classes.
It was
not difficult for the Globo network to consolidate the success
that has guaranteed it hegemony in the national television
industry during those decades. Globo's formula was very simple--it
is a combination of North American managerial and marketing
strategies; the artistic creativity of Brazilian intellectuals,
almost always based on popular movements; and the efficiency
of producers from the electronic media, the advertising or
film industries, but recycled with foreign advisors. Additionally,
the political will of the company to invest heavily in technology
and research, to attune itself to the technical innovations
and the aspirations of the average consumer, is included in
the strategy. Naturally, the support of the military government
was instrumental. This support was assured to Globo, since
the company was owned by a communications conglomerate clearly
opposed to trade union populism and autarchic nationalism--hallmarks
of the Brazilian political scene in the era after the Second
World War.
With
the difficulties encountered by Globo's competitors--a mix
of financial crisis and bitter fighting between the successors
of the pioneers of our television industry--the Globo Network
filled all the available spaces, availing itself also of the
telecommunications infrastructure constructed by the military.
Globo's rise was meteoric, winning over almost 80% of the
prime-time viewing audience and more than 60% of the total
advertising revenues. This situation was one of a virtual
monopoly in Brazilian television, granting enormous negotiating
powers to Globo's owners, the Marinho family. The Marinhos
own a holding company which controls more than 100 businesses
throughout the country, 110 television stations, a radio chain,
magazine and book publishing companies, record companies,
and other varying commercial, industrial, and financial undertakings.
Their market power was so strong that the military government
took the initiative to stimulate competition in the national
market by forming the SBT and Manchete networks.
But it
would take almost 10 years before the competing networks chipped
away at the Globo monopoly. These competitors took advantage
of the flank opened in the national scene, when Globo took
on the foreign market, with great success in selling telenovelas,
series, musical, children's, and sports shows. In addition
to exporting programs to more than 130 countries, Globo operated
TV Monte Carlo, aimed at the Italian market, and took part
in co-productions with foreign companies, public or private,
in the areas of television and popular music.
Particularly
in the area of telenovelas, shown to be a creative stronghold
of Globo, the latest productions are repetitions of the formulas
which proved successful in recent years. The preoccupation
with the foreign market led to a certain inattention to the
national market, which allowed the competition to mount an
offensive. The Manchete network exploited ecological themes
and rediscovered the power of regional cultures and landscapes,
particularly in those areas endowed with beautiful and primitive
geography. For its part, SBT made a play for audience segmentation,
importing Mexican telenovelas (produced by Televisa) and conquering
parts of the children's market and sections of the popular
sector which remained faithful to classic melodrama. There
is also a resurgence of public television, primarily TV Cultura
of São Paulo, which is slowly improving program quality,
importing quality European and North American shows, and meeting
the demand of certain sectors of the middle class who are
dissatisfied with the typical pattern of commercial stations,
for example, the student youth.
So we
have, today, a healthy competition between the national television
networks, each one looking to define its own niche in the
market. In 1991, there were 229 stations, divided among five
national networks: Globo with 78, SBT with 45, Manchete with
38, Bandeirantes (Marinhos-owned) with 32, and Educativas
with 21. Additionally, there are 15 independent stations.
These figures have changed slightly since the introduction
in 1992 of the first network based outside of Rio or São
Paulo: the OM Brasil Network, headquartered in Parana, with
20 affiliated stations.
Evidently,
the Globo network continues to meet the preferences of the
majority, in part because the assault of its competitors forced
it to review its market strategies. Without discounting the
foreign market, mainly in Europe (which is starting to be
supplied through co-productions with Spanish, Swiss, and Portuguese
companies), Globo has sophisticated national productions awaiting
the verdict of the viewers. In a sense, one can say that the
genre of the telenovela is being neglected in the attempt
to rescue the uniqueness of Latin American melodrama, without
sacrificing technical quality, speed of action, and erotic
or landscape appeal. In addition, the attempt is being made
to regain the pulse of the viewers' daily lives, while validating
the different regions.
In addition
to Globo, two other Brazilian networks--Manchete and Bandeirantes--are
players in the foreign markets, exporting primarily to the
other American countries. The possibilities for trade are
becoming more attractive with the formation of the Mercado
Commun del Cono Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone),
which started operations in 1993. The agreement includes Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The regional corporation
Brasil-Sur, which owns a chain of local stations in the border
areas between these countries, is showing much interest in
exploiting the potential of this new market that is about
to open for cultural and information trade.
On the other hand, opportunities are opening up in the Brazilian
market for the importation of programming from other countries
in the region, insofar as Latin American cultural industries
apply production initiatives aimed at export markets, adopting
aesthetic codes capable of being decoded by more discerning
viewers. Until now, the imports to Brazil have been limited
to popular types of programming. The SBT network, which made
tentative moves towards the production of tear-jerker telenovelas,
in the conventional Latin American vein, has been importing
Televisa productions since last year, and showing them during
prime time. However, it looks as though SBT is disposed to
start Mexico-Brazil co-productions. On its end, the new network
Brasil OM is starting to import Argentine telenovelas.
Exports
for the Latin American market
The Brazilian presence on the international television market
dates back to 1975, when the Globo network exported its first
telenovela to Portugal. The success of this adaptation of
author Jorge Amado's Gabriela with Portuguese viewers caused
the corporation to realize the potential of the South American
market. The second telenovela to be exported was O Bem Amado,
written by Dias Gomes, dubbed into Spanish, and sold to an
station in Uruguay. This was also a success.
These
initial probes revealed the potential for exploiting a new
market, but there was one obstacle. The cost of dubbing by
a Venezuelan company was very high--something like U.S.$150,000
per telenovela. Sales operations for other Latin American
countries indicated that the return on investment was insufficient,
recouping little more than the cost of the dubbing.
Therefore,
the corporation decided to increase its foreign trade, adopting
an economy-of-scale strategy, much like the approach of the
American companies in the 1950s. Wherever Globo's product
were shown, they were incorporated into the viewing habits
of local audiences. This gradually won loyalty influenced
the fixation with the Globo products, generating a mid-sized
constant sales flow. And the return on investment was impressive:
in 1977, Globo was making a profit of U.S.$1 million from
the exporting of telenovelas. By 1985, that figure increased
to approximately $15 million, and has recently reached the
level of $20 million a year. This is a small portion of the
total profits of this conglomerate, which are in the $700
million range.
Undoubtedly,
the expectation of future profit is a determining factor in
the interest in foreign markets. Recently, Globo spent close
to U.S.$45 million to build a studio set aside for export
productions. This industrial complex covers 38,000 square
metres in the Jacarepagua region of Rio de Janeiro.
The other
Brazilian networks are also looking to the foreign markets.
The Manchete network got a good reception for telenovelas
in the U.S. Latin market. Dona Beija was broadcast during
prime time in 1991 by the Spanish-language Univision network.
It was seen by a good-sized audience by American standards,
getting a 12-point share in Los Angeles, 9 in Miami, and 5
in New York. Making a return of approximately U.S.$7 million
for exhibition rights in the North American market, the network
is now concentrating its efforts on the U.S. and European
markets, with slow short-term financial returns compared to
the $250 million average profit for the exhibition of the
same telenovela in Latin American countries. Undoubtedly,
the success of these products on the Latin American market
alerted North American Hispanic broadcasters to the possibilities
of airing telenovelas.
Meanwhile,
the Bandeirantes network, which had successfully exported
the telenovela Os imigrantes to other Latin American countries
years before, was starting to produce mini-series with the
intention of exporting them to Germany, Portugal, and Venezuela.
The Latin
American market was still being served almost exclusively
by the Globo Network, which was exporting to 20 countries
in the region on a regular basis, offering an average of four
telenovelas per year. In the European market, the sales figures
were higher, say, about U.S.$9 million per episode sold to
Germany. In the regional market, however, prices varied and
programs were often offered at a reduced price. There are
hints that El Salvador paid only U.S.$150 per episode, while
in Uruguay the price was U.S.$350 per episode.
This
is explained in part by the reduced financial capabilities
of the countries with small markets, but it also reflects
the ferocious competition with the cultural industries of
Mexico and Venezuela, which are able to undercut costs as
a result of having lower production costs because they do
not need to dub their shows. While in Brazil Globo spends
$30 million per episode (this figure was higher in the past,
surpassing $100 million per episode in the ``super-production''
type of telenovelas), in Mexico Televisa spends a mere $5
million per episode of a normal telenovela, and up to $20
million per episode for the glitzy telenovelas, like O Pecado
de Oyuki. This last telenovela's story took place in Japan,
and the production company had to construct special sets and
wardrobes, in addition to the usual cost of equipment and
actors. Another expensive Mexican production was Sendas de
Gloria, a reconstruction of various episodes from Mexico's
history, including some very elaborate battle scenes.
In any
case, the prices charged by the Brazilian company in the international
market are more competitive than those charged by North American
companies. The exhibition rights to a Globo telenovela (with
at least 120 episodes) is one third the cost of a North American
series (with an average of 20 episodes). The difference is
that North American exporters, on the strength of past exports,
have captive audiences and large stocks of programming. Latin
American producers, on the other hand, are just starting to
contend for parts of this market, with smaller stocks, and
the need to have attractive prices to make sales in the short
term.
In accordance
with increases made by the three Brazilian exporters of telenovelas,
Globo is maintaining a steady flow of products to the Latin
American market. This market does not include just the countries
traditionally identified as Latin America, but also the Spanish,
Portuguese, and Italian population segments in North America--both
the U.S. and Canada.
To conquer
the Latin American market, Globo has been working hard for
the past 15 years, adopting marketing strategies which assure
it a privileged place in the regional television industry.
But the flow of Brazilian television fiction to Latin America
is not limited to products no longer shown by stations in
Brazil. The pattern of programs, production pacing, and artistic
quality of the shows are being noticed by producers in other
countries who would like to learn from the Brazilian model
to develop their own industries.
As such,
Brazilian teleplay writers are being contracted by other countries
to write the scripts for local productions, or for those destined
for the international market. One example of this is Manuela,
written by Brazilian Manuel Carlos, co-produced by an Italian-American
company, and successfully distributed in both Europe and the
Americas. Brazilian expertise is also being sought in children's
programming. The show Xou of Xuxa, which gained popularity
on the Globo network, now has a Spanish version, which is
produced in Argentina and exported to 16 countries, conquering
the hearts and minds of children in the entire region and
bringing in more than U.S.$1 million a month to the Brazilian
performer. This does not include the royalties from merchandising
products.
Another
form of export which is gaining momentum is the sale of telenovela
scripts by Brazilian writers, which are then adapted by young
writers in the importing countries and produced by local actors
and directors in a local setting. Chile has opted for this
type of stimulation of its television drama industry, having
bought the adaptation rights for many telenovelas written
by Janete Clair, Ivani Rebeiro, Lauro Cesar Muniz, Walter
Negrao, Casciano Gabus Medes, Braulio Pedroso, Gilberto Braga,
Chico de Assis, and Silvio de Abreu. These countries are taking
the same path that Brazil took in the 1950s and 1960s, when
it bought scripts from Cuba, Mexico, and Argentina.
Brazilian
television drama is gaining international repute as a result
of the creativity of its writers, performers, producers, and
distributors. But this reflects primarily the audacity of
undertakings of the Third World, which, as characterized by
Armand and Michele Mattelart (1987), is searching for more
balance in the global flow of information and culture, a utopia
bequeathed by Sean MacBride on new generations of intellectuals
(MacBride, 1980). This segment of the symbolic goods industry
accounts for royalties of approximately U.S.$100 million per
year to Latin America. More important is the place it gives
to our cultural identities on the global stage, and the confidence
it inspires in our national populations, inducing them to
discover themselves as diverse and powerful, capable of forging
their own roads for development of their society, mixing traditional
and modern elements, reason and passion, preservation and
pride.
Acknowledgment
Thank you to Aviva Farbstein for the translation of this article.
Note
1
The author would like to thank researchers Gloria Kreinz and
Mauro Alencar of the Núcleo de Investigación
de las Telenovelas of ECA-USP for their help in collecting
data and editing this section.
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